Using firm-level data on offshoring of Korean manufacturers, this paper examines the relationship between firm heterogeneity and the probability of adopting offshoring. The results of the paper suggest that firm productivity may not be an important determinant for Korean firms' offshoring decision. A firm's global sourcing decision may rather depend on other characteristics such as factor intensity, research and development (R&D) intensity, information and communication technology (ICT) level, and affiliation with foreign markets when industry specificity is controlled for.
Introduction
Offshoring is one of the most rapidly growing components of international trade. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) ªnd that growth in vertical specialization accounted for 30 percent of the growth in exports of 10 OECD countries and four emerging market countries between 1970 and 1990 . Between 1992 , intermediate input trade was reported to have grown by around 11.9 percent a year (see Figure 1 ). This rapid expansion has triggered much research into the factors underlying the sourcing behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs). The remarkable increase in international production sharing that is reºected in unusually high growth rates for the exchange of components or partially assembled manufactured goods is documented in published studies (Ng and Yeats 2003) .
Offshoring is deªned as the relocation by a ªrm of production stages-both manufacturing and services-from one country to another. It is contrasted to outsourcing though the two terms are closely related. Outsourcing refers to subcontracting business processes to a third party. Thus, foreign outsourcing means the relocation of business processes to an external supplier in another country. In contrast, the scope of the term "offshoring" can include internal sourcing via MNEs' own foreign afªliates as well as foreign outsourcing to the third party.
The potential adverse effect on employment of offshoring, which can lead to a hollowing-out effect, is still an ongoing political debate. Offshoring is widely accepted by many ªrms based on the belief that offshoring can be productivity-enhancing through cost savings and access to more advanced technology in business processes.
One of the main driving forces behind the rapid expansion of offshoring was the development of information and communication technology (ICT) in the 1990s. Production systems involving design, production, delivery, and installation consist of a number of complex components, all of which require coordination technologies. In addition, these communication technologies are a major limitation on coordination across production networks (Harris 2001) . Furthermore, offshoring itself incurs additional costs that are unnecessary for in-house production (adjustment costs, transaction costs, and search costs). The advanced technology in services, represented by Internet-based communications networks, contributes to lowering these costs and facilitating offshoring.
From ªrm-level perspectives, a critical issue concerning offshoring is which type of ªrm engages in offshoring. The new international trade literature is motivated by empirical evidence that ªrm differences within sectors may be more pronounced than differences between sector averages (Baldwin and Okubo 2006) . Firm heterogeneity in productivity is introduced by Antras and Helpman (2004) as a key element of the choice of ownership structure and supplier locations. Antras (2005) incorporates incomplete international outsourcing contracts with a dynamic general equilibrium model of trade to explain the development of product cycles and production sharing between the North and the South.
1 Pioneered by Melitz (2003) , Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) show that high-productivity ªrms engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) and less productive ªrms export, whereas the lowest productive ªrms serve only the domestic market. Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show that the level of communication costs and the size of the skill overlap are two key parameters in explaining the type 159 Asian Economic Papers Firm Heterogeneity in the Choice of Offshoring 1 'The North' refers to wealthy and advanced nations in the world as many wealthy countries are located in the northern hemisphere, and 'the South' refers to relatively poor countries.
Figure 2. Boundary of offshoring
Source: Abramovsky and Grifªth (2006) .
of ªrms engaging in offshoring. From the general equilibrium model, they prove that when the skill overlap is large and communication costs are high, only the most productive and large ªrms will engage in offshoring, whereas when the skill overlap is small and communication costs are low, the least productive ªrms engage in offshoring. This study has embedded contracting models into the standard general equilibrium models that explain trade based on differences in endowments of factors across countries and monopolistic competition arising from "love for variety." Jones and Kierzkowski (2005) show the empirical evidence supporting the prevalence of disagglomeration. The data used for empirical tests are on trade in parts and components during the period 1990-2000, according to the SITC Rev.2 system. Their results support the hypotheses that growth of the world economy and technological improvements in service link activities contribute to raising the degree of fragmentation by lowering the business connection charges.
There is a dearth of empirical studies on offshoring at ªrm level, as the vast majority of literature in this area has been at the aggregate level (see, for example, Swenson 2000; Gorg and Hanley 2003; Tomiura 2005; and Abramovsky and Grifªth 2006) . Using the ONS database on United Kingdom establishment, Abramovsky and Grifªth (2006) ªnd that more ICT intensive ªrms are more likely to purchase offshore than less ICT intensive ªrms. Their analysis, however, only includes offshoring of business services, not manufacturing. Although service outsourcing is rapidly growing, the majority of offshoring occurs in manufacturing sectors and it is hard to extend the implication of the empirical tests of service offshoring to the general cases. Our data set covers offshoring of both manufacturing and services.
Due to the data constraint, ªrm-level studies often use an indirect way of deªning offshoring. Abramovsky and Grifªth (2006) employ expenditure on a number of speciªc services as a measure of outsourcing of business services. Gorg and Hanley (2003) use imports of general intermediates as a proxy for international outsourcing. However, this indirect way of deªnition may include purchases of standardized inputs from the marketplace. Swenson (2000) examines a set of ªrms located in U.S. foreign trade zones, in which ªrms may tend to engage more in offshoring compared to other ªrms outside the foreign trade zones. He also uses foreign input usage to measure outsourcing. Tomiura (2005) ªrst attempted to resolve this problem. He used the distinguishable data set covering all manufacturing ªrms in Japan. The term 'outsourcing' in his paper is deªned as purchasing goods or services via contract excluding purchasing of goods in the market without a contract. It seems quite close to 'offshoring' in our paper, which covers both contracting-out to own subsidiaries (foreign insourcing) and to the third party (foreign outsourcing). However, the survey result used in Tomiura (2005) contains data for 1998, which may not exactly reºect the recent trend of Japanese ªrms' offshoring. We use a data set from the result of a recent survey in 2006, and the number of observation is much smaller than that in Tomiura. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004) , in which the exposure to a foreign market is associated with the high productivity of ªrms. However, ªrm heterogeneity in our model stems from other ªrm aspects such as ICT, ªrm size, afªliation with foreign markets, capital intensity, and R&D intensity, as well as labor productivity. Second, we examine the effect of ªrm heterogeneity on the extent of offshoring as well as the offshoring decision to investigate whether the ªrm characteristics are related with the level of international fragmentation. Third, we employ the use of Internet skills to measure the ªrm's ICT level. In Tomiura (2005) , the number of computers is considered, which seems to be an indirect way of estimating the effect of ICT. To measure an establishment's ICT intensity, Abramovsky and Grifªth (2006) use data on investment in software and a dummy variable of Internet use in ordering goods and services. Because the Internet is now a public good and most ªrms have access to the Internet in ordering somehow, the data on whether a ªrm uses the Internet may not capture the true level of ICT. Fourth, the outsourcing of nonproduction overhead services is covered in the deªnition of outsourcing in our data set, which is not included in Tomiura (2005) . The service sector is the fastest growing sector to which ªrms are involved in offshoring, though the level of offshoring to services is still much lower than that of the manufacturing sector.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates the pattern of offshoring by Korean manufacturers. Section 3 outlines the econometric frame-works and describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Data description
The main variable of interest is offshoring. Our offshoring data are taken from the survey on the international outsourcing by Korean manufacturers undertaken in 2007 by Gallup Korea, a survey research institute. The offshoring data include 689 ªrms covering years 2001 and 2006. The survey provides rich information on domestic and international outsourcing, R&D intensity, exports by foreign subsidiaries, Internet use, and so forth, at the ªrm level.
Around 24 percent of ªrms are reported to engage in offshoring in 2006, although the majority of ªrms are not involved in offshoring (see Table 1 ). Among ªrms, 43.7 percent of them are outsourcing to the domestic market only and 32.3 percent do not outsource at all. However, the growth rate of offshoring between 2001 and 2006 is 55.7 percent, reºecting the rapid expansion of international fragmentation by Korean manufacturers. Table 2 shows the share of offshoring by industry. The second column reports the share of ªrms included in each industry. The share of offshoring ªrms is reported in the third column. The fourth column reports the average value of offshoring as a percentage share of total input purchases. Apparel and fur product industries are the sectors in which ªrms are most actively involved in offshoring. Furniture and textile rank second and third, respectively, in the frequency of offshoring. Electronic parts, video, sound, and telecommunication facilities come next.
More than 80 percent of offshoring take place in manufacturing industries. During the last ªve years, however, offshoring services have been growing more rapidly than manufacturing. The growth rates of offshoring metallic pattern, parts and components, and ªnal good assembly and processing are 58.1 percent, 54.8 percent, and 70.6 percent, respectively, whereas those in the service sector, R&D services, customer support, law and accounting, and miscellaneous business are 75 percent, 100 percent, 83.3 percent, and 76.5 percent, respectively.
Model
Based on the idea that important sources of offshoring decisions could exist within ªrm heterogeneity, we employ a probit model to capture the effects of ªrm-level variables of interest on a binomial decision on whether to introduce offshoring or not. Offshoring decision is again divided by decision on foreign insourcing (offshoring to its own subsidiaries) and foreign outsourcing (cross-border arm's-length transactions). For comparison, we also test for the role of ªrm characteristics in the choice of domestic outsourcing. Our model is in line with Abramovsky and Grifªth (2006) and Tomiura (2005) , but, as previously mentioned, we use the technology variable, which seems to be a more useful instrument to measure the true level of ICT of a ªrm than the number of computers used in Tomiura (2005) . Considering various factors, we carry out regressions to examine what determines the offshoring choice by Korean manufacturers. A reduced-form speciªcation of offshoring choice by ªrm i in industry j is as follows,
where Y i is the ratio of offshore-outsourced goods and services to total input purchases of ªrm i. In addition, it can be a probability estimated in a logit and probit model representing a discrete decision on whether to offshore. By using the two measures of offshoring, we are able to investigate whether both the extensive and intensive margin of offshoring can be explained.
Z i is a vector of ªrm-level explanatory variables that are likely to inºuence a ªrm's offshoring decision. These variables are ICT, Productivity, Size, K/L, R&D, and FDI.
ICT is a ªrm's ICT level. Harris (2001) suggests that the process of global production can be attributed in part to the search for gains from specialization among developed countries. However, the existence of global and industry-wide coordination costs can be obstacles to specialization. He argues that the rapid improvements and extensions in communications networks may substantially lower these coordination costs among related suppliers and customer ªrms in manufacturing industries. His model, however, analyzes the macroeconomic equilibrium and emphasizes the role of economy-wide network costs as a limit to international fragmentation. To contrast, we focus on the differences in communication technology across ªrms in production sharing. Offshoring incurs higher transaction costs for the searching partner or supplier, making contracts, ordering, and shipping internationally, compared to in-house production or domestic outsourcing. Firms with a high level of communi- cation technology may lower these costs and beneªts from offshoring. Our data are based on the survey results. The survey questionnaire classiªes ªrms into the level of Internet use. At stage 1, the lowest level, the Internet is utilized only for checking personal e-mail and searching for documents. Brochure ware, building web sites, and invoicing are available at stage 2. At stage 3, ªrms use e-commerce and on-line sales are available. At stage 4, transactions between companies, invoicing, and connecting to shipping system via Internet occur. Stage 5 is for e-enterprise. All the business processes are re-engineered through combination of off-line and on-line activities. Also, a ªrm's internal organization and external partners are connected online. Because the ICT variable is in a composite number, we create dummy variables for each stage and regress them on an offshoring decision. The cut-off point of ICT level affecting offshoring decision is found to be stage 3 or e-commerce (see Table 3 ). Thus, we use the dummy variable E-Commerce to represent whether a ªrm has, at least, an ICT level of e-commerce.
Productivity is measured by a ªrm's labor productivity. Antras and Helpman (2004) show that provided that headquarters' service intensity is low, more productive ªrms are more likely to serve foreign markets via offshoring. This is because these ªrms are those that are able to overcome the ªxed costs of offshoring. Using the data on offshoring performed by 3,723 Japanese keiratsu in 1994, however, Kimura (2002) found no relationship between proªt per sales and outsourcing contract.
Size, the sales of a ªrm, controls for the effect of ªrm size on offshoring decision. Large ªrms may take advantage of exercising dominant market power over both domestic and foreign outsourcing suppliers in offshoring contracts, which could raise the tendency of participation in offshoring compared to small or medium ªrms.
K/L represents capital intensity measured as capital-labor ratio. Theoretically, more capital-intensive ªrms prefer in-house production rather than international outsourcing, as capital-intensive ªrms usually have a more complicated structure of production to depend on external procurement. Because offshoring has both aspects of intra-ªrm trade between headquarter and foreign afªliates and external sourcing, the predicted sign of the effect of capital intensity on offshoring is not clear; if more ªrms offshore through FDI than outsourcing, it can be positive. Otherwise, the sign can be negative.
R&D stands for ªrm's R&D intensity measured as the value of R&D expenditure per sales. Glass and Saggi (2001) found that ªrms could raise the ratio of offshoring through cost reduction and proªt increase accomplished by an increase in R&D investment. R&D expenditure is also regarded as an ideal proxy for expected techno- logical change. Bartel, Lach, and Sicherman (2008) show that ªrms engaging in R&D are 11-12 percent more likely to outsource some part of their production. They interpret the result as the demand for outsourcing increasing with the probability of technological change. In contrast, Antras and Helpman (2006) suggest that R&D intensive ªrms tend to choose FDI rather than foreign outsourcing as contracting is more difªcult for technologically complex or advanced inputs. In sum, the predicted sign of the impact of R&D is positive for the choice of foreign insourcing, but obscure for foreign outsourcing.
Afªliation with foreign markets is also considered one of the important ªrm characteristics that can affect the offshoring decision. We test for the impact of foreign market afªliation via FDI. FDI is a dummy variable on whether a ªrm has foreign subsidiaries or not. Firms exposed to foreign markets through FDI may beneªt from access to a foreign production network in searching for offshoring partners.
j are industry dummies that control for the industry-speciªc effects in the choice of offshoring, for example, and labor intensive sectors such as the apparel and fur product industry may have high demand for outsourcing intermediate inputs to a region where cheap labor is abundant. We include 41 industry dummy variables in the regression. Because many ªrms have multiple subsidiaries across countries and a majority of ªrms outsource to China, we do not test for regionspeciªc ªxed effects for the host region to which ªrm i outsources. as well as any other unobserved factors. We control for heteroskedasticity of error term. Table 4 shows the summary statistics of variables. A correlation matrix of variables is reported in Appendix 1. Most explanatory variables are not highly correlated.
Empirical results
Our empirical results are reported in Tables 5 through 8. Table 5 reports the marginal effects of independent variables on sourcing a dummy variable in probit estimation. Column (1) reports the estimates of the equation in which only the decision of outsourcing in a domestic market is used for a dependent variable. The results of the regression on outsourcing to own subsidiaries, cross-border arm's length transactions, and offshoring are shown in columns (2), (3), and (4), respectively. Labor productivity shows a negative sign for domestic outsourcing and foreign insourcing decisions. The ªrm size is positively related with the probability of adopting domestic outsourcing while the coefªcient of FDI shows signiªcant and negative sign. From column (2), ªrms that offshore to their own subsidiaries seem to be those with a high ICT level, large ªrm size, low capital intensity, and high R&D intensity. Column (3), however, shows that the deterministic ªrm characteristics can be different between the case of foreign outsourcing to the third party and that of the foreign insourcing. The effect of the ICT level and ªrm size are found to be insigniªcant in column (3). This result is somewhat puzzling as increasing the use of ICT level is expected to lead to more outsourcing rather than vertical integration. R&D intensity and labor intensity, however, are still signiªcantly positive. In our data set, the impact of ICT supports more FDI rather than foreign outsourcing through substantially lowering the internal costs of communication. Column (4) shows the result when a binomial offshoring decision is taken as the dependent variable. The coefªcient on the ICT level has a signiªcantly positive sign at the 5 percent level.
In addition, ªrms with high R&D intensity are more likely to engage in offshoring. A 1 percent increase in ªrm's ICT level and R&D intensity may raise the probability of offshoring by 0.088 percentage point and 0.034 percent, respectively.
This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction by Glass and Saggi (2001) . It also reºects the fact that ªrms tend to opt for offshore procurement under a highly changing technological environment. The FDI dummy variable is positively related with the choice of offshoring, which supports the hypothesis that ªrms having foreign afªliates are more prone to introduce offshoring. Capital intensity is negatively associated with an offshoring decision. Firm size and productivity do not seem to be signiªcant factors in an offshoring decision. Table 6 reports the estimation result on equations in which the share of offshoring out of the total input purchase is the dependent variable. Because many ªrms do not offshore at all, substantial portions of the observations cluster at zero. To correct the censoring bias that may be caused by the zero value of offshoring, we estimate a tobit model (censored regression model). The main implication is similar to the results from Table 5 in which the binary offshoring decision is the dependent variable, though there are gaps in the value of coefªcients and elasticity. The level of ICT above e-commerce, R&D intensity, and foreign market access could be positively related with the amount of offshoring, while capital-labor ratio is negatively related. Labor productivity does not seem to be a signiªcant factor on sourcing strategy. The large ªrm size is positively associated with domestic outsourcing and foreign insourcing.
One of the major concerns is that a sourcing decision may be endogenously determined. For instance, ªrms that anticipate offshoring may invest more in R&D as there can be more room for investment because of future cost savings from offshoring. To resolve the potential endogeneity problem, we employ a probit and a tobit model with endogenous regressors. R&D intensity and productivity are instrumented by lagged variables of year 2001. Table 7 shows the results of the probit IV estimation on an offshoring decision. From column (1), FDI is adversely related with domestic outsourcing. The coefªcient of ªrm size is positive, but not statistically signiªcant, which is different from the previous results in which the endogeneity problem is not considered. The ªrms procuring to their own subsidiaries are likely to be those with a high ICT level, high R&D intensity, low capital intensity, and large size. This result is consistent with the previous ones. For ªrms outsourcing to a third party in foreign countries, however, none of the ªrm characteristics are signiªcantly relevant. Combining foreign outsourcing and insourcing, an offshoring decision may be determined by high R&D intensity and foreign market access via subsidiaries. Interestingly, the signiªcance of the coefªcient of ICT level on the choice of offshoring disappears when endogeneity is considered. The result suggests that ªrms may intentionally raise the ICT level to increase the effectiveness of offshoring. This result is consistent with the tobit IV model reported in Table 8 .
Overall, the probit model estimation ªnds that the ªrm productivity 2 may not be an important source for offshoring decisions by Korean manufacturing ªrms. This does not support the theoretical prediction by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) that ªrms with higher productivity are the only ones that can overcome the higher ªxed 169 Asian Economic Papers Firm Heterogeneity in the Choice of Offshoring 2 The effects of ªrm productivity remain insigniªcant when labor productivity is replaced by total factor productivity. cost entailed by serving a foreign market than domestic ªrms. In addition, the result is not consistent with Tomiura (2005) where ªrms tend to outsource more of their activities overseas when their productivity-when measured by both labor productivity and quasi TFP-is higher. This may be due to the fact that a majority (about 80 percent) of Korean ªrms operate in China and these ªrms' performances are relatively low compared to ªrms offshoring to the rest of the world or to domestic ªrms, though the differences may not be signiªcant (see Figure 3 and Appendix 2: Figure 5 ).
Rather, other ªrms' heterogeneity may be a more relevant factor regarding sourcing decisions. The empirical results show that ICT level is positively related with the offshoring decision, particularly for the case of offshoring to their own afªliates. This makes sense in that a higher ICT level can facilitate the cross-border transactions between ªrms and can contribute to lowering monitoring costs. However, the estimation result of probit IV suggests that it is highly possible that the ICT level and offshoring decision are endogenously determined. In addition, the insigniªcant coefªcients of ICT on decisions of cross-border arm's length transactions shown in Tables 5-8 seem puzzling. The implication from the positive impact of R&D intensity is in line with the prediction by Glass and Saggi (2001) . However, both probit IV and tobit IV show that the coefªcient of R&D for foreign outsourcing is insigniªcant while it is positive, and signiªcant for offshoring via FDI. This result is in line with Antras and Helpman (2006) that the R&D sales ratio tends to be higher for foreign internal sourcing compared with foreign outsourcing. The negative relationship between capital intensity and the probability of offshoring also supports the prediction of theory. However, the results from the probit and tobit models with endogenous covariates suggest that labor-intensive ªrms are more likely to choose foreign insourcing while factor intensity may not signiªcantly impact foreign outsourcing, and this does not support the prediction by Antras (2003) that labor-intensive goods may be traded at arm's length, while capital intensive goods are transacted within ªrm boundaries. The consistently positive and statistically signiªcant coefªcients of FDI reveal the role of foreign market afªliation in saving the search cost of input suppliers in an offshoring market.
Conclusions
Offshoring is chosen by many manufacturers as a response to a highly competitive global environment, although the overall impact of offshoring on ªrm performance is still under debate. 3 This paper examined the ªrm characteristics as one of the main driving forces behind sourcing decisions. The empirical tests on Korean manufacturing ªrms do not seem to support the new HFT model. Firm productivity fails to explain the offshoring decision. The result may imply that the sourcing decision of Korean manufacturers could be made irrespective of ªrm performance. Rather, development of information technology to reduce the cost of communication, factor intensity, investment in R&D, and foreign market experiences to lower the search costs may be more important elements than productivity in making sourcing decisions. High R&D intensity and FDI speciªcally play signiªcant roles in adopting offshoring and the main implication is robust to sensitivity analyses using alternative proxy to an offshoring decision with endogenous regressors.
The ªndings of this paper have important policy implications for Korea. Because the access to foreign markets is crucial for an offshoring decision, policies should be designed to strengthen consulting to encourage ªrms to actively search for intermediate input suppliers and to participate in an international production network. Because, however, an offshoring decision should be made by ªrms, government consulting should be conªned to providing information based on databases of foreign suppliers. The proportionate increase of intra-ªrm trade to ICT level suggests that to facilitate offshoring via FDI abroad, infrastructure should be provided. An incentive system such as a tax credit for investments in ICT may be a useful instrument. 
